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Prsha: Evaluating the Special Needs Doctrine

NOTE
Evaluating the Special Needs Doctrine in the
Context of Higher Education
Ryan Prsha*

I. INTRODUCTION
On June 17, 2011, Linn State Technical College1 adopted a drug-testing
policy that read as follows:
Linn State Technical College will begin a drug screening program in
the fall semester . . . for students who are newly classified as degree or
certificate seeking and degree or certificate seeking students returning
after one or more semesters of non-enrollment at the Linn State Technical College campus or any Linn State Technical College location.2

Never before had a public college or university in the United States implemented a mandatory school-wide drug-screening policy such as this.3
Each and every incoming student was to be tested, and those who failed the
test or refused its administration were to have their college admission with-

*
B.S., University of Missouri, 2014; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School
of Law, 2017; Note & Comment Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2016–2017. Special
thanks to Professor Brad Desnoyer for his guidance throughout the writing process
and to my family for their continued support.
1. Linn State is a hands-on trade school that prepares its students to enter the
workforce in one of a wide range of potential careers. Programs, STATE TECHNICAL
C. MO., https://www.statetechmo.edu/programs/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2017). Because
of the inherent nature of some of these careers, a portion of the students enrolled learn
how to operate heavy machinery and handle dangerous materials. Kittle-Aikeley v.
Claycomb, 807 F.3d 913, 917 (8th Cir. 2015), vacated (Feb. 18, 2016). It is worth
noting that in 2014, “Linn State Technical College” became the State Technical College of Missouri (“STCM”).
History, STATE TECHNICAL C. MO.,
https://www.statetechmo.edu/history/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2017). However, because
the Eighth Circuit opinions still refer to the school as “Linn State,” this Note will do
so as well.
2. Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 917 (quoting Drug Screening, STATE TECHNICAL
C. MO., https://eagleonline.statetechmo.edu/ICS/Drug_Screening.jnz (last visited Jan.
17, 2017)).
3. Timothy Williams, At One College, a Fight over Required Drug Tests, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/11/us/at-linn-statetechnical-a-fight-over-required-drug-tests.html?_r=0.
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drawn.4 Unsurprisingly, members of the Linn State student body were troubled by this policy and filed suit against the college.5
While the case law governing school drug-testing policies is fairly well
developed,6 this dispute marked the first time that the reasonable privacy
expectation of college students had been scrutinized in such a fashion.7 The
issue is polarizing, and the lawsuit against Linn State was handled inconsistently at various levels of the judicial system.8 The manner in which the case
was handled will likely have broad and lasting implications on the privacy
rights of college students throughout the country, not only regarding drug
testing, but also in other aspects of the standard higher education experience.
Part II of this Note discusses the legal context in which this issue must
be framed and gives a brief history of how the courts have handled public
school drug-testing policies to this point. Part III examines the current state
of drug testing in the academic setting – specifically focusing on the ongoing
legal situation at Linn State. Part IV delves into questions concerning the
Eighth Circuit’s current treatment of the Linn State situation, as well as the
potential approaches that the judiciary could take in future cases.

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
This Part will first review the intricacies of the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. It will then discuss the
special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and
how that exception has been applied to mandatory drug-testing policies.

4. Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 917–18.
5. See id. at 918.
6. See id. at 920 (outlining Supreme Court cases that addressed student drug

policies in primary schools).
7. See id. at 920–21 (“The current matter is a hybrid of [] two lines of cases, so
while they are informative they are not wholly dispositive and ultimately do not alter
the analysis that must be conducted . . . .”); Williams, supra note 3 (“Linn State is the
first public college in the country to require all adult students to submit to mandatory
drug tests.”).
8. See Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 916–17; Barrett v. Claycomb, 705 F.3d 315,
318 (8th Cir. 2013) (vacating the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction in
the facial challenge of the policy); Barrett v. Claycomb, 976 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1137
(W.D. Mo. 2013) (finding policy constitutional as applied to students in certain programs), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Kittle-Aikeley v. Claycomb, 807 F.3d 913 (8th
Cir. 2015), and aff’d in part and rev’d in part en banc sub nom. Kittle-Aikeley v.
Strong, 844 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 2016) (en banc); Barrett v. Claycomb, No. 11-cv04242-NKL, 2011 WL 5827783, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 29, 2011) (issuing a preliminary injunction as to the facial challenge of the policy), order vacated, 705 F.3d 315
(8th Cir. 2013).
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A. The Fourth Amendment and Its Special Needs Doctrine
The Fourth Amendment is an important, yet controversial, pillar of the
U.S. legal system.9 By protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures,
the doctrine establishes an essential limitation on government power.10 In
order for the government to search or seize an individual’s “person[], house[],
papers, [or] effects,” it must first show probable cause11 and obtain a warrant.12 If probable cause and a warrant are present, then the search is considered reasonable, and the amendment affords no protection to the individual.13
While this rule appears reasonably straightforward, there are a number
of exceptions to the warrant requirement that create an aura of confusion in
its practical application. One of these exceptions requires no warrant, requires no probable cause, and is potentially unlimited in scope: the special
needs doctrine.14
9. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & LAURIE L. LEVENSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
INVESTIGATION 31 (2d ed. 2013) (“No technique of law enforcement is more important than the ability of the police to search for evidence and the ability of the police to seize what they find and to arrest individuals suspected of criminal activity.
No aspect of criminal procedure has produced more Supreme Court decisions or arises more frequently in the lower courts.”).
10. It is important to note that the Fourth Amendment is only implicated if the
government or someone acting on the government’s behalf is performing the search.
Id. at 10 (“The Bill of Rights protects individuals against the power of the State. . . .
The Fourth Amendment is the key constitutional provision governing police conduct
during searches and seizures.”). The Fourth Amendment provides no protection
against unreasonable searches conducted by private individuals; this is known as the
state action doctrine. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 519 (4th ed. 2011).
11. Probable cause essentially means that there is a fair probability or substantial
chance that evidence of a crime will be found. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238–
39 (1983). More specifically, probable cause to search for or to seize evidence requires that an officer is possessed of sufficient facts and circumstances as would lead
a reasonable person to believe that evidence or contraband relating to criminal activity
will be found in the location to be searched. Id. Likewise, probable cause to make an
arrest exists when an officer has knowledge of such facts as would lead a reasonable
person to believe that a particular individual is committing, has committed, or is about
to commit a criminal act. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 372 n.2 (2003) (citing
Brinegar v. United States, 388 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949)).
12. Specifically, the Fourth Amendment provides “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. In general, a warrant must be issued by a neutral magistrate, supported by an oath or affirmation, and
state with particularity the place to be searched. CHEMERINSKY & LEVENSON, supra
note 9, at 111–12.
13. CHEMERINSKY & LEVENSON, supra note 9, at 111–12.
14. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987).
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The special needs doctrine recognizes certain instances when “special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impracticable.”15 Such instances include administrative searches,16 searches at border crossings17 and checkpoints,18 searches
in jails and prisons,19 searches of arrestees,20 and certain drug-testing policies.21 The litigation that surrounds drug testing at public colleges and universities has focused specifically on the drug-testing portion of the special
needs exception.

B. The Drug Test
Courts have long recognized that the administration of a drug test by an
agent of the government amounts to a “search” under the Fourth Amendment.22 Therefore, any time a drug test is administered by or on behalf of the
government, it must be conducted under the reasonableness standard.23 Although this standard generally specifies a need for probable cause and a warrant, suspicionless drug-testing policies have been deemed acceptable under
the special needs exception in three contexts: the workplace, public schools,
and hospitals.24
15. Id. at 873 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., concurring)).
16. See Camara v. Mun. Court of City & Cty. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967)
(stating that “‘probable cause’ to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable
legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied
with respect to a particular dwelling”). See also New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691,
693 (1987) (finding a warrantless search of an automobile junkyard falls within the
exception of the warrant requirement for administrative inspections of “pervasively
regulated industries”).
17. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 (2004) (concluding
“the Government’s authority to conduct suspicionless inspections at the border includes the authority to remove, disassemble, and reassemble a vehicle’s fuel tank”).
18. See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990) (concluding sobriety checkpoints do not violate the Fourth Amendment).
19. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cty. of Burlington, 132 S. Ct.
1510, 1513–14 (2012) (holding “courts must defer to the judgment of correctional
officials unless the record contains substantial evidence showing their policies are an
unnecessary or unjustified response to problems of jail security”).
20. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2012) (concluding “DNA
identification of arrestees is a reasonable search that can be considered part of a routine booking procedure”).
21. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 659–66 (1995) (holding
the warrantless drug testing of students who voluntarily participate in high school
athletics does not violate the Fourth Amendment).
22. Id. at 652, 653–54.
23. Id. at 652.
24. CHEMERINSKY & LEVENSON, supra note 9, at 257. This falls under the “special needs” warrant exception. Id. The underlying theory is that drug use is a signifi-
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This exception was first recognized in the area of government employment.25 In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, the Supreme Court of
the United States upheld federal regulations requiring railroad workers who
were involved in accidents to be drug tested.26 In this case, the Court was
clear that there was a “special need” to ensure the safety of the traveling public.27 Further, the fact that the tested employees worked in “an industry that
is regulated pervasively to ensure safety” created a diminished expectation of
privacy.28 Therefore, the government’s special need to ensure safety for its
passengers justified the abrogation of a citizen’s Fourth Amendment protection from blood tests.29
This rationale was also used in National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab.30 In Von Raab, the Court upheld a U.S. Customs Service policy
that required drug testing for any customs worker who was to hold a job in
which firearms or drugs were present.31 Unlike in Skinner, there was no reason to suspect that the individuals being tested in this case were using
drugs.32 Nonetheless, the Court believed that there was still a special need to
make sure that any employee who carried weapons or investigated drug trafficking did not use drugs himself or herself.33 This special need was sufficient to justify a suspicionless search.34
The extent of the holdings in Skinner and Von Raab was finally limited
eight years later in Chandler v. Miller.35 In this case, the Supreme Court
struck down a statute requiring all candidates running for political office to
pass a drug test.36 The Court found no special need because (1) there was “no
evidence of a drug problem among . . . elected officials,” (2) “those officials
typically d[id] not perform high risk, safety-sensitive tasks, and” (3) “the
required certification immediately aid[ed] no interdiction effort[s].”37 Although drug use calls into question “an official’s judgment and integrity[] . . .
and undermines public confidence and trust in elected officials,” the Court
was clear that no special need could be found absent some “indication of a

cant problem, and there is a special need to make sure that certain individuals in certain situations are drug free – this special need overrides the typically essential Fourth
Amendment reasonableness protections. See id.
25. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 633–34 (1989).
26. Id. at 634.
27. Id. at 620–21.
28. Id. at 627.
29. Id. at 634.
30. 489 U.S. 656, 678–79 (1989).
31. Id. at 674.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
36. Id. at 323.
37. Id. at 321–22.
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concrete danger demanding departure from the Fourth Amendment’s main
rule.”38
It was not until Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton in 1995 that the
special needs exception was extended to cover drug testing in public
schools.39 In Acton, the Court held a public school may implement a suspicionless drug test as long as the school has a legitimate interest in doing so
and the test is not too intrusive.40 Although the “ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is ‘reasonableness,’” courts handling
the tolerability of warrantless drug testing in public schools have used three
factors in guiding their decisions.41

1. Nature of the Privacy Interest
Courts first examine the nature of the privacy interest upon which the
search at issue intrudes.42 The greater the privacy interest, the less likely it is
that a suspicionless drug test will be found reasonable.43 It is well accepted
that the inherent custodial responsibility schools possess over their pupils
creates a lesser expectation of privacy for the students within the school environment.44
In Acton, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a student’s
participation in school-sponsored sports programs was adequate on its own to
warrant the school’s suspicionless, warrantless drug test of that student.45
Although the Court “caution[ed] against the assumption that suspicionless
drug testing will readily pass constitutional muster in other contexts,” it also
explicitly stated that “the most significant element [in deciding so in this case
was] . . . that the Policy was undertaken in furtherance of the government’s
responsibilities, under a public school system, as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its care.”46
This concept was taken even further in Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, in which the
Supreme Court held that suspicionless drug testing of students in all extracurricular activities was “a reasonable means of furthering the School District’s
important interest in preventing and deterring drug use among its schoolchildren.”47 As the Court reasoned, “[S]tudents who participate in competitive
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 318–19.
515 U.S. 646, 664–65 (1995).
Id. at 664–65.
Id. at 652 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
Id. at 654.
See id.
See id. at 654–55; see also Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830 (2002); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
341–42 (1985).
45. Acton, 515 U.S. at 664–65.
46. Id. at 665.
47. 536 U.S. at 838.
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extracurricular activities voluntarily subject themselves to many of the same
intrusions on their privacy as do athletes” and should therefore be subject to
the same lowered expectation of privacy.48 This supposed consent to intrusion allowed the Earls Court to extend the Acton doctrine even further.49
The rulings in Acton and Earls laid the foundation for how lower courts
analyzed suspicionless drug tests of students in all public schools: the greater
the involvement of the student, the greater the school’s custodial responsibility.50 This increased custodial responsibility, in turn, created a lower expectation of privacy for those students, subsequently tipping the scales of reasonableness in favor of the schools in these types of cases.51

2. The Character of the Intrusion
The second factor that courts evaluate when deciding whether a suspicionless drug test in a public school fits under the special needs doctrine is
“the character of the intrusion imposed by the [drug-testing p]olicy.”52 Specifically, “the ‘degree of intrusion’ on one’s privacy caused by [carrying out
the drug test] ‘depends upon the manner in which production of the [] sample
is monitored.’”53 Although this factor will ultimately depend on the facts of
each particular case, both the Acton and Earls Courts concluded that the invasion of students’ privacy was insignificant in light of “the minimally intrusive
nature of the sample collection and the limited uses to which the test results
are put.”54 In Earls, “a faculty monitor wait[ed] outside [a] closed restroom
stall for the student to produce a sample and [] listen[ed] for the normal
sounds of urination in order to guard against tampered specimens and to insure an accurate chain of custody.”55 Additionally, the test results were not
turned over to any law enforcement authority and were used only for purposes of limiting a failed student’s privilege of participating in extracurricular
activities.56 The procedure followed by the school district in Acton was nearly identical to the one in Earls.57
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 831–32.
See id.
See id.; see also Acton, 515 U.S. at 657.
See Earls, 536 U.S. at 832; Acton, 515 U.S. at 657.
Earls, 536 U.S. at 832 (citing Acton, 515 U.S. at 658).
Id. (quoting Acton, 515 U.S. at 658).
Id. at 834; Acton, 515 U.S. at 660.
Earls, 536 U.S. at 832.
Id. at 833.
In Acton, the school district’s policy required male students to produce samples at a urinal. Acton, 515 U.S. at 658. The students “remain[ed] fully clothed and
[were] only observed from behind, if at all.” Id. Furthermore, the female students
were required to “produce samples in an enclosed stall, with a female monitor standing outside listening only for sounds of tampering.” Id. Additionally, the tests in
Acton looked only for “standard” drugs, and the test did not change depending on the
identity of the student. Id. Equally important to the Acton Court, “the results of the
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3. Immediacy of Concern
The final factor courts consider in these types of cases is the nature and
immediacy of the government’s concerns.58 Once again, both the Acton and
Earls Courts reached similar conclusions.59 The Court in Acton reasoned that
“[d]eterring drug use by our Nation’s schoolchildren is at least as important
as [deterring drug use in government employees who perform dangerous
jobs].”60 The Acton Court was clear in its assertion that “[s]chool years are
the time when the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs are
most severe” and that “[m]aturing nervous systems are more critically impaired by intoxicants than mature ones are.”61 While the nature and immediacy of drug use by young school children is clearly seen as significant enough
by the court, it is unclear if the same logic holds for older college-aged students. This distinction is particularly noteworthy in light of recent developments.

III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Linn State was the first public college in the country to implement a
school-wide suspicionless drug-testing policy for all incoming students.62
Therefore, in Kittle-Aikeley v. Claycomb – the lawsuit dealing with Linn
State’s policy – the Eighth Circuit faced a matter of first impression.63 Prior
to the enactment of Linn State’s policy, suspicionless drug-testing policies in
colleges and universities had generally been limited to student-athletes.64
tests [were] disclosed only to a limited class of school personnel who have a need to
know; and they [were] not turned over to law enforcement authorities or used for any
internal disciplinary function.” Id. In a fashion similar to the policy in Acton, the
school district’s policy in Earls required “a faculty monitor [to] wait[] outside [a]
closed restroom stall for the student to produce a sample.” Earls, 536 U.S. at 832–33.
The Earls opinion itself notes that “[the] procedure [used by Pottawatomie] is virtually identical to that reviewed in [Acton], except that it additionally protects privacy by
allowing male students to produce their samples behind a closed stall.” Id.
58. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 660.
59. See id. at 661; see also Earls, 536 U.S. at 834.
60. Acton, 515 U.S. at 661 (first citing Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989); and then citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489
U.S. 602, 628 (1989)).
61. Id. (quoting Richard A. Hawley, The Bumpy Road to Drug-Free Schools, 72
PHI DELTA KAPPAN 310, 314 (1990)).
62. Jeremy L. Kahn, Shedding Rights at the College Gate: How Suspicionless
Mandatory Drug Testing of College Students Violates the Fourth Amendment, 67 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 217, 217 (2012); see also Rachel Bloom, Pass a Drug Test Before You
Can Pass a Class, ACLU: BLOG (Sept. 8, 2011, 5:05 PM),
http://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/pass-drug-test-you-can-pass-class;
Williams, supra note 3.
63. See 2 KEVIN B. ZEESE, DRUG TESTING LEGAL MANUAL § 8:7 (2d ed. 2016).
64. See id.; see also Kahn, supra note 62, at 233.
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Therefore, the result of this case will have a significant impact on the future
rights of college students. Prior to Kittle-Aikeley, the circumstances under
which college-aged students had been tested were extremely limited.65 The
only notable instances of student drug testing happened at Liberty University
and the University of Maryland.66

A. College Drug Testing Prior to Linn State
In 1988, Liberty University, a private Christian school in southwestern
Virginia, became the first college in the United States to implement a drugtesting policy for non-athletes.67 Under its policy, Liberty required all students to sign a waiver consenting to random tests.68 Those who refused were
expelled.69 Although it was estimated that two-thirds of the student body
were opposed, no litigation ensued because “testing by a private institution is
legal if it is incorporated in the [wavier] agreement [that the] students sign.”70
The school then tested about 200 students per month, most of whom were
actually still chosen on the basis of some sort of probable cause.71
Some public institutions, such as the University of Maryland, have instituted drug-testing policies as a disciplinary measure.72 At Maryland, any
student previously found guilty of a drug-related offense becomes subject to
periodic drug testing.73 While not suspicionless, this policy represents the
most notable use of student drug testing at a public university to date. Other
public schools, such as the University of North Carolina, have actively rejected any form of mandatory drug testing whatsoever.74 While student-athletes
at North Carolina are subject to the standard NCAA drug-testing requirements, the university itself has declined to implement any separate policies of
its own.75 The university, which had “substantial concerns regarding the constitutionality and basic fairness of [a] mandatory program,” decided that even
student-athletes “should be not singled out” by the school itself.76

65. See ZEESE, supra note 63, § 8:7; Kahn, supra note 62, at 233.
66. See ZEESE, supra note 63, § 8:7; Donald P. Baker, Liberty U. to Test for

POST
(Apr.
24,
1988),
Drugs,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1988/04/24/liberty-u-to-test-fordrugs/8fe0daf5-e869-4f41-9bbb-6b778cc3fb28/.
67. ZEESE, supra note 63, § 8:7.
68. Baker, supra note 66.
69. Id.
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. ZEESE, supra note 63, § 8:7.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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B. Suspicionless Testing in Public Universities
Kittle-Aikeley v. Claycomb dealt with the imposition of a mandatory,
suspicionless drug-testing policy by Linn State Technical College.77 The
Appellees – a group acting on behalf of current and future students of the
college – sought a declaratory judgment that the school’s mandatory, schoolwide drug-testing policy was in violation of the Fourth Amendment.78
The drug-testing policy was adopted in June 2011 for the purpose of
“provid[ing] a safe, healthy and productive environment for everyone who
learns and works at [the college] by detecting, preventing and deterring drug
use and abuse among students.”79 Any student who refused to submit to the
screening was subjected to “administrative or student-initiated withdrawal.”80
Shortly after the testing began, the Appellees brought suit, claiming the policy was “facially unconstitutional” and sought an injunction prohibiting the
school from carrying out the policy.81 It was the students’ belief that because
the policy required neither a warrant nor probable cause, the tests were unreasonable and thus violated the students’ Fourth Amendment right of protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures.82 Both the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Missouri and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit have heard this case repeatedly.83 This case was initially filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Missouri under the name Barrett v.
Claycomb84 and assumed the title Kittle-Aikeley v. Claycomb after being remanded and appearing in front of the Eighth Circuit a second time.85 Most
recently, the Eighth Circuit reheard the case en banc – vacating its panel deci77. 807 F.3d 913, 917 (8th Cir. 2015), vacated (Feb. 18, 2016).
78. Id. at 918.
79. Id. at 917. The policy read as follows: “Linn State Technical College will

begin a drug screening program in the fall semester of 2011 for students who are
newly classified as degree or certificate seeking and degree or certificate seeking
students returning after one or more semesters of non-enrollment at the Linn State
Technical College campus or any Linn State Technical College location.” Id. (quoting Drug Screening, supra note 2).
80. Id. at 917–18. Under the policy, “if a test returned positive, the student
would have 45 days ‘to rescreen and test negative to remain enrolled.’” Id. at 918
(quoting Drug Screening, supra note 2). It was estimated that “[a]pproximately 550
students paid a $50 fee for the drug test that fall and were tested.” Id. The test results
were not revealed to law enforcement personnel regardless of the outcome. Id. at
917.
81. Id. at 918.
82. See Brief of Appellees at 16, Kittle-Aikeley v. Claycomb, 807 F.3d 913 (8th
Cir. 2015) (Nos. 13-3264, 14-1145), 2014 WL 2158892, at *16.
83. Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 918–19. See also Barrett v. Claycomb, 705 F.3d
315, 319–20 (8th Cir. 2013); Barrett v. Claycomb, No. 11-cv-04242-NKL, 2011 WL
5827783, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 18, 2011), order vacated, 705 F.3d 315 (8th Cir.
2013).
84. Barrett, 2011 WL 5827783, at *1.
85. See Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d 913.
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sion that reversed the district court’s permanent injunction – and affirmed the
district court’s permanent injunction.86 This iteration of the case assumed the
name Kittle-Aikeley v. Strong to reflect the name of the new President of Linn
State, Shawn Strong. The reinstatement is fresh, and it is unclear whether
Linn State will appeal to the Supreme Court, leaving uncertainty in this area
of the law.

1. Barrett and the Initial Ruling
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri first heard
the case back in 2011 to determine whether a preliminary injunction was necessary to cease testing.87 The district court not only found that the challengers met the “fair chance” of success standard necessary for the injunction, but
it went even further in asserting the injunction would still be appropriate under “the more rigorous ‘likely to prevail’ standard.”88 On interlocutory appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the preliminary injunction.89 The case was
subsequently remanded to the district court for a full proceeding.90
When the Western District heard the case on remand, the challengers
“clarified that they sought as-applied relief.”91 In order to analyze the drugtesting policy as it was being applied, the district court conducted a programby-program investigation to “ensure that the category of students subject to
the drug-testing policy [was not] defined more broadly than necessary to meet
the policy’s purposes.”92
86. Kittle-Aikeley v. Strong, 844 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
87. Barrett, 2011 WL 5827783, at *1. The number of students who were initial-

ly subject to drug testing was relatively insignificant. See Barrett, 705 F.3d at 319.
Approximately one week after Linn implemented the policy, the Western District
granted a temporary restraining order, “enjoining any further testing of samples and
any reporting of results to the school.” Id. at 320. A few months later, the court
granted the full preliminary injunction discussed in this section. Id.
88. Barrett, 705 F.3d at 320.
89. Id. at 325. The Eighth Circuit overruled the preliminary injunction on the
grounds that it was impossible “to hold that the drug-testing policy [was] unconstitutional on its face in every conceivable circumstance.” Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 918.
90. Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 918 (citing Barrett, 705 F.3d at 320–21, 321 n.4,
324–25). The court “reiterate[ed] that in order to receive injunctive relief, no matter
whether the court applied a ‘likelihood of success on the merits’ or a ‘fair chance of
prevailing’ standard, the appellees could not satisfy their ultimate burden in mounting
a facial challenge under the Fourth Amendment that no set of circumstances existed
under which the policy would be valid.” Id. This is an interesting response to the
district court’s assertion that the evidence was so overwhelmingly in favor of the
Appellees that they would prevail even on a higher standard than what is required by
the law.
91. See id. (discussing Barrett v. Claycomb, 976 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (W.D. Mo.
2013)).
92. Barrett, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 1107. See infra notes 97–98 and accompanying
text for a complete list of the programs offered. Linn State offers programs in a wide
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In making a decision, the district court weighed the students’ expectation of privacy against Linn State’s special need to administer the test in order
to assure a safe educational environment.93 The students who were enrolled
in programs preparing them for professions in heavily regulated industries94
were given a lower expectation of privacy.95 Students enrolled in all other
programs were judged as having the typical privacy expectation adults generally enjoy.96 The district court ultimately held that drug testing was acceptable for students enrolled in only some97 of Linn State’s many degree programs.98 Therefore, the mandatory school-wide policy was struck down as
unconstitutional.99

2. The Vacated Opinion
In the subsequent appeal, the Eighth Circuit once again reversed the district court’s decision and reinstated the original drug-testing policy.100 The
court stated that “the current matter is a hybrid of [] two [previously established] lines of cases,[101] so while [the existing case law is] informative[, it
is] not wholly dispositive and ultimately do[es] not alter the analysis that
must be conducted” in each instance.102 In concluding that the original drugvariety of specialty areas, each of which can be categorized into either the mechanical, electrical, civil, or computer industry. Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 917. Most
students take approximately 75 percent of their courses in their chosen field, and each
program allows the student extensive hands-on experience. Id.
93. Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 919 (summarizing Barrett, 976 F. Supp. 2d 1104).
94. A regulated industry is one that is “controlled by government rules.” ReguDICTIONARY,
lated
Industry,
CAMBRIDGE
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/regulated-industry (last visited
Jan. 17, 2017).
95. Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 919 (summarizing Barrett, 976 F. Supp. 2d 1104).
96. See id.
97. Specifically, “the district court determined that Linn State could reasonably
conduct drug testing in the following program areas: Aviation Maintenance, Industrial
Electricity, Electrical Distribution Systems, Power Sports, and CAT Dealer Service
Technician.” Id.
98. Id. Further, “the court held that it was unconstitutional for Linn State to drug
test students participating in the following programs: Auto Body; Auto Mechanics;
Heavy Equipment Technology; Medium/Heavy Truck Technology; Electronics Engineering Technology; Electrical Power Generation; Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning; Commercial Turf and Grounds Management, Machine Tool Technology;
Computer Programming; Construction and Civil Technology; Networking Systems
Technology; Design Drafting and the remainder of Linn State’s approximate twentyeight distinct academic programs.” Id.
99. Id.
100. See generally id.
101. That is, those cases dealing with government employment and those dealing
with public schools. See id. at 920.
102. Id. at 920–21.
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testing policy should be reinstated, the court pointed to four main considerations behind its analysis:
(1) the public has a valid interest in deterring drug use among students
engaged in programs posing significant safety risks to others; (2)
“some college students that attend Linn State have a diminished expectation of privacy because they are seeking accreditation in heavily
regulated industries and industries where drug testing, in practice, is
the norm[]”; (3) Linn State’s testing procedures significantly minimize
the intrusiveness of Linn State’s drug-screening program and are relatively noninvasive, thus the invasion of students’ privacy is not significant[]; and (4) the need to prevent and deter the substantial harm that
can arise from a student under the influence of drugs while engaging
in a safety-sensitive program provides the necessary immediacy for
Linn State’s testing policy.103

This court made it clear that while deterring drug use among students
who pose a safety risk to others is an important concern, it is not the only
concern.104 Most notably, deterring drug use among students who pose a
safety risk to themselves also creates a significant special need.105
The Eighth Circuit next claimed that the unique atmosphere at Linn
State, alone, “establish[es] a special need sufficient to support the balancing
of interests necessary in these circumstances.”106 Indeed, the court noted that
“[u]sing drugs while attending classes at a technical school uniquely limited
to instruction . . . where a large percentage of the students on campus are
performing hands-on work . . . on a daily basis[] poses a unique safety risk
that does not necessarily exist on other college campuses.”107 It was the
court’s opinion that “[t]he very nature of these programs and the unique vocational focus of the college itself involves dangerous aspects and creates safety
risks [rising to the level of special need].”108 Therefore, rather than the program-by-program approach used by the district court, the Eighth Circuit saw
the nature of the school itself as sufficient to establish a blanket “special
need” classification for the entire student body.109
103. Id. at 921 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Barrett v. Claycomb, 705 F.3d
315, 322 (8th Cir. 2013)).
104. Id. at 921–22.
105. Id. at 922. To justify this need, the court pointed to Skinner, in which case
“the Court acknowledged the axiomatic nature of the governmental interest in ensuring the safety of the public ‘and of the employees themselves.’” Id. (quoting Skinner
v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 621 (2004)). See also Nat’l Treasury
Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 669–71 (recognizing that both the physical
safety of border employees themselves and the safety of others are threatened by
employees in an impaired state).
106. Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 922.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 923.
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In doing so, the Eighth Circuit used the three-part balancing test specified in both Acton and Earls.110 The court stated that the fact that “this case
involves students is a key component of the privacy interest at stake although
not determinative on its own.”111 The court recognized that the lowered expectation of privacy realized in both Acton and Earls “rel[ies] heavily on the
tutelary aspect of our nation’s public schools, ‘permitting a degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults.’”112 However,
even though “the privacy interests of college students in a public technical
school are more akin to those we bestow upon individual adults,” the court
still found that “Linn State certainly maintains a level of supervision appropriate for students in this particular college setting.”113
Noting that the privacy interest here was a combination between that of
an adult employed in a dangerous government job and that of a student in a
more protected educational setting, the court decided that “the expectation of
privacy for all Linn State students is somewhat diminished as they are either
entering into areas of instruction and future fields of employment in highly
regulated and safety-sensitive positions; or they are juxtaposed with students
who are doing so.”114 Therefore, the court found that “[Linn’s] unique environment requires a heightened level of supervision and somewhat diminished
expectation of privacy [for all the students].”115
The second factor in the balancing test – the character of the intrusion –
was only briefly mentioned in the opinion and found to be fulfilled.116 The
court simply stated that compared to the policies prevalent in existing case
law, “[t]he [drug-testing] procedures [used at Linn State] significantly minimize the intrusiveness of Linn State’s drug-testing policy and the invasion of
students’ privacy is not significant.”117
Regarding the third factor – the immediacy of the harm – the court mirrored the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Acton and Earls, which both found a
requisite need to drug test in order to prevent drug use among a school’s student population.118 Although the demographics of the student body at Linn
State are different from the student bodies discussed in Acton and Earls – the
former comprised of college students and the latter two of high school students – the Eighth Circuit deemed this difference insignificant in light of the

110. That is, the nature of the privacy interest, character of the intrusion, and nature and immediacy of the harm. See supra Part II.B.
111. Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 924.
112. Id. (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995)).
113. Id.
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 925.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 925–26. See also Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 834–35 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995).
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government’s need to prevent drug use among the Linn State student population.119
Specifically in Kittle-Aikeley, the court pointed to studies establishing
that “[d]rug use has been found linked to . . . injuries and deaths, and . . . that
the incidence of drug abuse and addiction on college campuses is steadily
rising, which is particularly acute in a vocational setting where the programs
involved have dangerous and safety-sensitive components.”120 Although
these studies were clearly directed at “drug use . . . among our Nation’s
young people,” the court was confident that “the problem [does not] abate[]
the day after high school graduation” and thus avowed that “the data [were]
certainly relevant to the instant discussion.”121 Taking this into account, the
court concluded that “the need to prevent and deter the substantial harm that
can arise from a student under the influence of drugs while engaging in a
safety-sensitive program provides the necessary immediacy for Linn State’s
testing policy.”122
Because the immediacy of the harm outweighed the nature of the privacy interest and character of the intrusion, the court held that the school-wide
drug-testing policy instituted by Linn State adequately fell under the “special
needs” exception to the warrant requirement and was therefore a reasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment.123 Thus, the majority found that the
district court erred by “permanently enjoining Linn State from administering
its drug-testing program to students in specific, enumerated programs.”124

3. A Vocal Dissent
The dissenting judge in this case believed that a permanent injunction
from Linn State’s suspicionless drug-testing policy should have been granted
for all but five of the academic programs available at the school.125 This conclusion was reached on the grounds that “Linn State ha[d] only met its burden
of demonstrating a drug-related public safety concern for five academic programs” because when “public safety is not genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth
Amendment precludes the suspicionless search, no matter how conveniently
arranged.”126 Because there are only five programs in which “a concrete risk
of injury to others” exists, the dissent disagreed with the implementation of
the policy for the remaining twenty-three programs.127 Nonetheless, tracking
the majority opinion, the dissent walked through the Fourth Amendment
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 926.
Id. at 925–26 (first and second alterations in original).
Id. at 926.
Id. at 925.
See id. at 926.
Id. at 921.
Id. at 927 (Bye, J., dissenting).
Id. at 928 (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997)).
Id.
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analysis from a school-wide perspective128 in order to determine whether the
policy – as upheld by the majority – was constitutional.129
Using the same balancing test, the dissenting judge, Judge Bye, concluded that the drug-testing program is unconstitutional.130 It is his belief that
“adults have a strong Fourth Amendment privacy interest in being free from
warrantless search and seizure,” and that “[t]he majority discount[ed] this
position by attempting to analogize the privacy interests of high school students as being consistent with the privacy interests of adult college students.”131 Under this theory, “the mere possibility of cross enrollment between programs [should not be] enough evidence to justify drug testing for all
students.”132 The dissent essentially argued it is age that creates the nature of
the privacy interest rather than a person’s status as a student, and that college
students have a greater expectation of privacy than those dealt with in Acton
and Earls.133 Therefore, Judge Bye concluded that without substantial evidence that extensive cross-enrollment into dangerous classes actually happens
– which could create a public safety concern – there should be no diminished
expectation of privacy for adult college students.134
Additionally, the dissent found the character of the intrusion and the
immediacy of the concern to be inadequate justifications under Earls and
Acton.135 Judge Bye specifically took issue with Linn State’s “parental notification clause,” which would allow the school to share a student’s results
with his or her parents.136 Furthermore, he accused the majority of using
“fear-ridden rationale[s]” in order to justify an unconstitutional policy.137 He
noted that Linn State has “successfully operated for fifty years before deciding . . . that a drug-testing policy was essential for safeguarding its students.”138 Consequently, it was Judge Bye’s belief that, while drug abuse is a
serious problem, there was no evidence or specific event that created the immediate interest necessary to invoke the special needs doctrine.139
The vastly differing opinions held by not only the district court and the
Eighth Circuit, but by the individual judges on the Eighth Circuit, shows the
way the law handles a college student’s reasonable expectation of privacy is
currently at a crossroad.

128. Essentially assuming (unwillingly) that Linn State had met its burden of
proving special need. Id. at 929.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 931.
131. Id. at 929.
132. See id.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 929–30.
135. Id. at 930–31.
136. Id. at 930.
137. Id. (discussing the majority’s view on the massive drug problem in society).
138. Id. at 930–31.
139. Id. at 931.
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4. The Rehearing – The Fragile State of the Law
It should be of no surprise that shortly after it came to a decision, the
Eighth Circuit’s panel opinion was vacated and reheard en banc.140 This
time, the Eighth Circuit “affirm[ed] the district court’s order permanently
enjoining Linn State from drug testing students ‘who were not, are not, or
will not be enrolled’ in safety-sensitive programs.”141 In coming to this decision, the majority walked through a three-part “Special-Needs Analysis.”142
First, the majority analyzed safety as a special need. Here, the opinion
focuses particularly on the Supreme Court’s rulings in Skinner and Von Raab.
The majority noted that “[a]lthough the Supreme Court mentioned the safety
of the individual employees [in those cases], the Court upheld the suspicionless drug testing in those cases based on the broader interests of public safety
and security.”143 Therefore, the Strong majority concluded that the district
court did not err in refusing to strike down Linn State’s drug testing policy
“‘based on [the risk of harm to the individual students themselves]’ or . . .
whether a particular program poses a significant safety risk to others.”144
Next, the majority looked at whether fostering a drug-free environment
could act as a special need. In this section, the majority relied largely on
Chandler, Acton, and Earls in holding that “Linn State has not demonstrated
that fostering a drug-free environment is a special need.”145 The majority
focused on the fact that, like in Chandler, “no crisis sparked the . . . decision
to adopt the drug-testing policy,” and “Linn State does not believe it has a
student drug-use problem greater than that experienced by other colleges.”146
The majority noted that Chandler requires Linn State to “shore up an assertion of special need,” yet Linn State’s claims in this case were made
“[w]ithout any evidence.”147 Additionally, the majority found it “most significant[]” that, “[i]n contrast to [Acton] and Earls, . . . Linn State’s students are
not children committed to the temporary custody of the state.”148 Thus, the
Strong majority was clear that the state does not have the same magnitude of
responsibility in preventing drug use here as it did in Acton and Earls. Thus,
with no evidence of “an ‘immediate crisis’” or unusually high drug use, coupled with a lowered standard of responsibility, the majority concluded that
140. Kittle-Aikeley v. Strong, 844 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
141. Id. at 742 (quoting Barrett v. Claycomb, 976 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1137 (W.D.

Mo. 2013), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Kittle-Aikeley v. Claycomb, 807 F.3d 913
(8th Cir. 2015), and aff’d in part and rev’d in part en banc sub nom. Kittle-Aikeley v.
Strong, 844 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 2016) (en banc)).
142. Id. at 736.
143. Id. at 737.
144. Id. at 737–38 (first alteration in original) (quoting Barrett, 976 F. Supp. 2d at
1113).
145. Id. at 740.
146. Id. at 738.
147. Id. at 737–38.
148. Id. at 740.
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the need to foster a drug-free environment was not sufficient to warrant suspicionless drug testing in this situation.149
Finally, the majority evaluated the validity of the program-by-program
analysis as applied by the district court. Like the district court, the majority
here “f[ound] unpersuasive Linn State’s argument that the possibility of
cross-enrollment renders its drug-testing policy reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.”150 The majority noted that Linn State still has not provided
any evidence that cross-enrollment actually poses an issue, and that “unsupported assertions . . . are insufficient to justify the mandatory drug testing of
all incoming students.”151 Therefore, the court held that the district court’s
program-by-program analysis was properly applied.152
Despite the decision to rehear the case, the dissent still held strong to the
arguments made by the panel majority opinion that was vacated. The dissenting judges spent a large portion of their opinion reiterating nationwide drug
use statistics.153 Citing to a Surgeon General Report, the Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016, and the U.S. Sentencing Commission Statistical Information Packet for fiscal year 2015, the dissent articulated significant evidence
of a general drug-use problem across the country.154 However, the dissent
again provided no evidence of a drug problem at Linn State specifically.155
Instead, the dissent asserted “the Supreme Court does not require specific
evidence of drug use or abuse among those tested to support a drug-testing
policy as that in place at Linn State.”156
Additionally, the dissent argued that creating a safe school environment
is Linn State’s job as opposed to the judicial system’s. Essentially, it is the
dissent’s belief that the school administrators are in a better position than a
judge to make decisions impacting the safety of a school environment.157
Accordingly, the dissent held that “the court should not, and cannot, operate
as course-of-study-content experts discerning the relative safety issues arising
from or around various programs, educational or otherwise, offered at a technical school where significant safety risks abound.”158

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 739–40.
Id. at 741.
Id. at 742.
Id.
Id. at 743 (Beam, J., concurring and dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 745. Finally, the dissent took issue with the fact that “several lawyers
associated with the ACLU spent several days on the Linn State campus attempting to
recruit students to represent a Rule 23(b)(2) class opposing the testing,” and that “[i]t
is now virtually certain that no named class plaintiff is any longer a student at Linn
State.” Id. at 744. This led the dissent to conclude that “this litigation, as it is now
positioned, could reasonably be captioned ACLU v. Linn State College.” Id.
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Strong is set to become an important precedent in future deliberations
involving the privacy rights of college students. As of now, it is unclear
whether Linn State will continue to appeal its case. As such, it is important to
address the merit of the arguments being made by both sides.

IV. DISCUSSION
In this litigation, the Eighth Circuit was faced with a decision of potentially far-reaching significance for college students. The legality of Linn
State’s drug-testing policy should ultimately come down to the court’s “balanc[ing] [of] the invasive nature of [the policy] against its benefit[] to society.”159 This balancing act has been performed hundreds of times in courts all
across the country.160 While Linn State’s drug-testing policy was far from the
first to be challenged in court,161 the college context in which it took place
raised novel questions. There are several issues with the reasoning of the
Strong dissent. This Part attempts to shed light on the directions in which the
law should proceed. Additionally, this Part will delve into the potentially
broad implications that could result from handling future cases in the mold of
Linn State under the standards of Acton and Earls.

A. Lingering Concerns with Allowing Mandatory Drug Testing in Situations Like Linn State
At the moment, it is unclear whether the issues brought in Strong will be
heard again on appeal. Additionally, this issue has not been raised in any
other jurisdiction, and the rationales for both sides could potentially be seen
as persuasive. The reasoning suggested in the Eighth Circuit’s vacated panel
opinion and repeated in the en banc dissent is troubling for several reasons.
These erroneous rationales will be discussed in this Part.

1. Failure to “Shore Up”
First, the manner in which the vacated panel opinion approached the
special needs balancing test was concerning, particularly in its assessment of
the strength of the government interest at hand. While the en banc majority
addressed this in part, this Part will delve deeper into the ramifications of
such reasoning. The focal point of the vacated panel majority’s argument
159. Stephen F. Brock et al., Drug Testing College Athletes: NCAA Does Thy Cup
Runneth over?, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 53, 56 (1994).
160. Id. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty.
v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830–38 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646, 652–54 (1995).
161. See generally Brock et al., supra note 159, at 63–103 (discussing challenges
made by college athletes subject to mandatory drug testing by the NCAA and universities).
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was that the governmental interest in authorizing Linn State’s drug-testing
policy outweighed both the students’ privacy interests and the character of the
intrusion of the individual being tested.162 In finding so, the court asserted
that “the need to prevent and deter the substantial harm that can arise from a
student under the influence of drugs while engaging in a safety-sensitive program provides the necessary immediacy for Linn State’s testing policy.”163
In reality, the government failed to put forth significant evidence of an
immediate need. The only support for the government’s immediacy theory
was that “proponents [of the new drug policy have spoken of] research
[showing] that [d]rug use [is] linked to . . . injuries and deaths,” and that, in
general, “the incidence of drug abuse and addiction on college campuses is
steadily rising.”164 The research alluded to, whose source was unclear from
the opinion, was non-specific to Linn State.165 In fact, the evidence demonstrates no more of an immediate government interest in drug testing at Linn
State than it does any other university in the country.166
The dissent in the Eighth Circuit’s en banc opinion continued to cling to
the notion that an analysis of whether there is a special need for suspicionless
drug testing “does not require specific evidence of drug use . . . among those
tested.”167 Instead, the dissent asserted that “a drug use comparable to other
public colleges in America today almost certainly presents Linn State’s governing apparatus and its executive administrators with substantial health,
safety and, security problems, all of which are specifically ameliorated by the
College’s well-conceived drug-testing and screening program.”168
While the court’s belief that “drug abuse is one of the most serious problems confronting our society today” may hold merit, nonetheless, the fact that
a general governmental interest exists does not necessarily mean that the interest will outweigh the other side of the balancing test in each circumstance.169
In Earls, the Supreme Court was clear that “‘[while a] demonstrated
problem of drug abuse . . . [is] not in all cases necessary to the validity of a
testing regime,’ [it is necessary that] some showing does ‘shore up an asser-

162. Kittle-Aikeley v. Claycomb, 807 F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 2015), vacated (Fe.
18, 2016).
163. Id. (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 925–26 (third and fifth alterations in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
165. Id.
166. See id. at 931 (Bye, J., dissenting) (“Despite asserting the immediate necessity of the drug-testing policy, neither Linn State nor the majority cites any specific
events or studies applicable to Linn State . . . .”).
167. Kittle-Aikeley v. Strong, 844 F.3d 727, 743 (8th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Beam,
J., concurring and dissenting).
168. Id.
169. Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 926.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss4/20

20

Prsha: Evaluating the Special Needs Doctrine

2016]

EVAULUATING THE SPECIAL NEEDS DOCTRINE

1261

tion of special need for a suspicionless general search program.’”170 Therefore, for Linn State’s policy to be valid, there must actually be evidence that
the government’s interest in testing is greater than the privacy interests of the
students.
It appears that the vacated panel decision and en banc dissent sidestepped this requirement. Instead of putting forth real evidence that the government interest outweighed the privacy interest, both chose to simply establish the governmental interest’s existence and accept that as sufficient.171 Just
because a governmental interest exists should not be an adequate substitute
for showing that the governmental interest outweighs the students’ privacy
concerns. Unlike in Earls, Linn State failed to “shore up” its assertion for a
special need.172

2. Reliance on an Ambiguous “Juxtaposition” Criterion
Finally, to justify a lower expectation of privacy, the vacated panel opinion also relied on the premise that every student enrolled at the university is
either participating in “safety-sensitive positions” that warrant testing or is
“juxtaposed” with students who are.173 However, the term juxtaposed174 has
no apparent meaning in this context. The court provided an inadequate explanation for how such “juxtaposition” exists and why this juxtaposition of
students would warrant suspicionless drug testing of an entire student body.
The en banc dissent appears to justify this rationale on the grounds that hard
evidence of crossover is not necessary here because a special needs analysis
“actually demands a high order of generality in the matter of permitting testing.”175
Linn State offers twenty-eight different programs, ranging from computer science to heavy equipment maintenance.176 It was not disputed that
suspicionless drug testing for students enrolled in certain inherently dangerous programs, such as industrial electricity, was perfectly acceptable under
the special needs doctrine.177 However, just because a student is enrolled at
170. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536
U.S. 822, 835 (2002) (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319 (1997)).
171. See Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 926; Strong, 844 F.3d at 745–46 (Beam, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
172. See Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 928 (Bye, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 924 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
174. Juxtaposed means “to place (different things) together in order to create an
interesting effect or to show how they are the same or different.” Juxtapose,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/juxtapose (last
visited Jan. 18, 2017).
175. Strong, 844 F.3d at 747 (Beam, J., concurring and dissenting).
176. See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.
177. See Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 928 (Bye, J., dissenting) (“Linn State had the
burden of establishing its academic programs posed a genuine public safety risk.
Linn State met this burden for five academic programs because it demonstrated the
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the same institution as someone participating in dangerous activities does not
mean that student should have a lower expectation of privacy. While there is
bound to be some cross-enrollment between programs at any university, there
was no proof offered by the court that cross-enrollment into dangerous classes happens at any significant rate at Linn State.178 The vacated panel majority merely noted that the chance of cross-enrollment exists, without putting
forth any evidence that it actually happens.179 Therefore, the court could only
mean one of two things when it referenced the juxtaposition of students between majors: either that only the possibility of cross-enrollment exists or
simply that students attending class in a geographically proximate area to one
another is sufficient on its own. Under either interpretation, the reasoning is
inadequate.
Under the Linn State drug-testing policy, the students who do not participate in the dangerous programs have a lowered expectation of privacy – either because those students have the theoretical opportunity to participate in
the dangerous activities or because they are near those who already do.180 It
is not a stretch to see how either of these rationales could be applied to countless situations beyond this case. If opportunity and proximity were the significant factors in gauging the expectation of privacy, anyone who works or
goes to school in the vicinity of someone who participates in dangerous activities (or could possibly participate himself or herself) could be susceptible to
the same lowered expectations of that individual. A student’s constitutional
rights cannot be abridged solely because of the classwork of another student
nearby. Any further application of this rationale would create a significant
danger to everyone’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Instead, the burden should be on Linn State to track who is crossenrolling in classes that involve dangerous activities and test only those students. In a school of fewer than 1500 students, simply keeping track of those
who are enrolled in dangerous classes and only testing those students would
constitute an eminently more reasonable policy than depriving every student
of his or her Fourth Amendment rights. Thankfully, the Eighth Circuit took
the opportunity to remedy this with its en banc decision.

particular program presented a concrete risk of injury to others in the vicinity or simply that drug testing was the industry norm.”); see also Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 669–71 (1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489
U.S. 602, 620–21 (1989).
178. Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 930 (Bye, J., dissenting) (“Linn State did not meet
its burden of proof and the mere possibility of cross enrollment is insufficient to justify a Fourth Amendment exception.”).
179. The majority states the fact that students do not go to class “in a vacuum” as
its only evidence of cross-enrollment. Id. at 925 (majority opinion). This does nothing to actually prove cross-enrollment’s existence. The en banc dissent did not mention cross-enrollment.
180. Id. at 924.
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B. What Now? The Implications of Treating College Students Under
an Acton Standard of Reasonable Expectation
It is well established that the government needs a warrant and probable
cause to administer a drug test to an adult unless that adult is a government
worker whose job involves an element of danger to himself or others.181 It is
also recognized that high school students who participate in sports or other
extracurricular activities are susceptible to a lowered expectation of privacy.182 However, it is still unclear how the law should treat public college
students who seem to fall somewhere between typical working adults and
high school students.
Decisions such as Acton and Earls – the cornerstones of the law in the
context of public schools – both heavily rely on the custodial relationship that
a high school has with its students, and it is this relationship that provides the
basis of the students’ lowered expectation of privacy.183 Despite a school’s
additional responsibility in this context, judges initially granted the ability to
use suspicionless drug tests very hesitantly.184 Not only did the Acton majority feel the need to distinguish between the typical high school student’s expectation of privacy and that of the general public, but it also felt the need to
distinguish between the students in question – student athletes – and others
enrolled at the same school.185 The Acton Court alleged that athletes were the
“leaders of the drug culture” and cited factors such as pre-existing regulation
and the increased risk of injury to justify such lowered expectations.186 These
sorts of concerns do not generally exist for college students.187
Further, the Earls Court justified its extension of the Acton rule on the
grounds that students participating in extracurricular activities “subject themselves to many of the same intrusions on their privacy as do athletes.”188
These intrusions include off-campus travel, communal undress, and the existence of other rules and requirements that do not apply to the student population as a whole.189 Once again, these factors do not apply to the typical college student, and any attempt to stretch these rulings to cover such individuals
would be improper.

181. See generally Skinner, 489 U.S. 602; Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656.
182. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawtomie Cty. v. Earls, 536

U.S. 822, 831–32 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655
(1995).
183. See generally Earls, 536 U.S. at 822; Acton, 515 U.S. at 646.
184. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 665 (“We caution against the assumption that suspicionless drug testing will readily pass constitutional muster in other contexts.”).
185. Id. at 657, 664–65.
186. Id. at 649.
187. See Kittle-Aikeley v. Claycomb, 807 F.3d 913, 929 (8th Cir. 2015) (Bye, J.,
dissenting), vacated (Feb. 18, 2016).
188. Earls, 536 U.S. at 831.
189. Id. at 831–32.
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The Supreme Court of the United States actually made this point in the
Acton majority opinion, noting that “[it] caution[ed] against the assumption
that suspicionless drug testing will readily pass constitutional muster in other
contexts.”190 The Court stated that “[t]he most significant element [in its decision was] . . . that the Policy was undertaken in furtherance of the government’s responsibilities . . . as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its
care.”191 This focal point of the Court’s stance does not apply to college students in the same fashion. Few college students would consider their college
or university to have guardian or tutelary responsibility over them. Unlike a
high school, which treats students as dependents, a college or university has
comparatively little custodial responsibility.192 As such, analysis of a college
drug-testing policy should – as the dissent in the vacated panel decision noted
– follow more closely those cases dealing with on-the-job, government employment drug-testing policies such as those implemented in Skinner, Von
Raab, and Chandler. In reality, the experience of college students is much
more similar to that of the government employee, and the rules governing
their Fourth Amendment rights should parallel those of government employees.
Therefore, like in the government employment cases, the main factor in
deciding the constitutionality of a college’s suspicionless drug-testing policy
should be whether the students “perform high risk, safety-sensitive tasks.”193
Like the adults in Chandler, the special needs exception should not apply to
college students unless there is an “indication of a concrete danger demanding departure from the Fourth Amendment’s main rule.”194 Most college
students are not subject to such dangers any more than a typical adult is.
Because of this, most college students deserve the same privacy rights as a
typical adult.
The special needs exception must be handled with care. Applying the
holdings of Acton and Earls to college students could have sent the law down
a slippery slope. The warrant and probable cause requirements are necessary
aspects of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.195 The special needs exception
was originally intended to apply only in situations in which it was absolutely
necessary to fulfill a compelling purpose.196
190.
191.
192.
193.

Acton, 515 U.S. at 665.
Id. (emphasis added).
See id. at 656–57 (describing the custodial responsibility of a high school).
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 321–22 (1997); see also Nat’l Treasury
Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 669–71 (1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 620–21 (1989).
194. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 319.
195. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
196. There is an argument to be made that the Fourth Amendment was never even
intended to provide an answer to the problems caused by random drug testing in the
first place. David E. Steinberg, High School Drug Testing and the Original Understanding of the Fourth Amendment, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 263, 264 (2003) (“The
framers sought to proscribe physical searches of residences pursuant to a general
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It is hard to fathom that an individual’s status as a college student in and
of itself – when there is no reason to believe that there is a drug problem to
begin with – is a compelling enough reason to disregard a constitutional right.
Extending the special needs doctrine to cover the kinds of situations dealt
with in Linn State’s case would have risked allowing the exception to swallow the rule. If the court were willing to extend the scope of the special
needs exception to cover the average college student, extending it to all adults
would not be an inconceivable extension.197
The Supreme Court of the United States has only struck down a suspicionless drug test under the special needs doctrine a single time.198 Several
scholars fear that “[i]t is only a small stretch of logic to apply the . . . rationale [currently being used by the courts] to condone a law that required
suspicionless drug testing [of everyday activities].”199 What should be required in order to designate a special need is a truly “substantial” need. Reinstating the Western District opinion appears to reinforce this belief.

V. CONCLUSION
For the first time, a public college within the United States instituted a
mandatory drug testing policy for all incoming students.200 The manner in
which the courts handled this case represents a crossroad for the Fourth
Amendment as it is applied to college students. The state of the law appears
to be fragile, as the Western District of Missouri and Eighth Circuit were at
one time unable to agree on how to evaluate the case, and the Eighth Circuit
itself disagreed internally to the extent that it reheard Linn State’s case en

warrant, or without any warrant at all. The Fourth Amendment simply never was
intended to govern the issues raised by random drug tests.”).
197. See id.
198. See Chandler, 520 U.S. 305 (evaluating a Georgia law requiring all candidates for certain state-wide elected offices to certify that they had passed the drug test
that was challenged). According to Jennifer E. Smiley, this “represents the first, and
thus far the only, time that the Supreme Court has struck down a suspicionless drugtesting policy under the auspices of the special needs doctrine.” Jennifer E. Smiley,
Rethinking the “Special Needs” Doctrine: Suspicionless Drug Testing of High School
Students and the Narrowing of Fourth Amendment Protections, 95 NW. U. L. REV.
811, 824 (2001). See also Steinberg, supra note 196, at 270–71 (“The Fourth
Amendment was conceived to serve a single, specific purpose – to prevent the physical search of residences without a warrant, or pursuant to a general warrant. Courts
may attempt to develop a coherent regulation of random drug tests based on the
Fourth Amendment, but such attempts are doomed to failure. The Fourth Amendment never was intended to govern such controversies. With respect to the validity of
random drug tests in the public schools, the Fourth Amendment says nothing at all.”).
199. See, e.g., Smiley, supra note 198, at 838. One example is the drug testing of
automobile drivers involved in car accidents, “a step which at least one state has already taken.” Id. at 838–39.
200. Bloom, supra note 62.
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banc.201 The Eighth Circuit has most recently reinstated the Western District’s holding in favor of the Linn State student body. This is hopefully an
indication that the courts believe that college drug-testing policies should be
analyzed in the same manner as policies within the government employment
context. College students’ reasonable expectations of privacy should mirror
those of adults – not high school students.

201. See Kittle-Aikeley v. Claycomb, 807 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 2015), vacated (Feb.
18, 2016); Barrett v. Claycomb, 705 F.3d 315 (8th Cir. 2013); Barrett v. Claycomb,
976 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (W.D. Mo. 2013), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Kittle-Aikeley
v. Claycomb, 807 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 2015), and aff’d in part and rev’d in part en
banc sub nom. Kittle-Aikeley v. Strong, 844 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 2016) (en banc). See
also Kittle-Aikeley v. Claycomb, Nos. 13-3264, 14-1145, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS
2843 (8th Cir. 2016).
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